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I. INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND

In this paper, we argue that the social health insurance (SHI) system of
financing health care provides the most effective means of attaining universal
health coverage (UHC), the goal of every health system. We canvass two
reasons why SHI lends itself to emerging health systems in Africa. First, the
underlying philosophic basis of SHI - solidarity - is consistent with African
cosmology. Second, the financing system provides a veritable route for
countries to address the critical challenge of adequately funding health
systems. These factors underpin the enactment of Nigeria's National Health
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) Act, a legal framework which institutionalized
SHI in the country. Following the Act's passage, however, Nigeria did not
experience the same level of success as other African countries, such as
Ghana and Rwanda, both of which had introduced SHI as a system to finance
health care around the same time. This dichotomy - success stories in
Rwanda and Ghana versus underperformance in Nigeria - raises questions
which need to be fleshed out if Nigeria is to reap the dividends of SHI system.
This paper will explore these questions, with the goal of distilling the
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experiences in Rwanda and Ghana, and using the same to improve health care
financing in Nigeria.
A. Background
In 2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) published an authoritative
report which ranked Nigeria's health system 187 out of 191 countries
surveyed - better than only four countries, which, at the time, were all
engaged in armed conflict.) This means that among stable nations, Nigeria's
health system ranked worst. 0 Quite naturally, Nigeria's response was swift
and vociferous, with stunned disbelief and unremitting finger pointing across
the country. 0 The political leadership was aware of the dismal state of the
health system but was unaware of the exact nature and extent of the health
system's rot.f' Paradoxically, although it has been eighteen years since the
publication of the WHO Report, the health landscape in Nigeria has not seen
any significant improvement especially when juxtaposed with key health
indicators in other countries.0 The state of health in Nigeria compared to
what is obtainable in other countries, particularly those in Africa, is an
important concern because Nigeria is the most populous and boasts the

1.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000: HEALTH SYSTEMS:
IMPROVING PERFORMANCE 152,154 (Angela Haden and Barbara Campanini eds.,) (2000)

[hereinafter WHO] (providing a table of rankings which shows the countries which fared
worse than Nigeria including the Democratic Republic of Congo (188th), the Central African
Republic (189th), Myanmar (formerly Burma, 190th), and Sierra Leone (191st)); HUM. RTS.
WATCH, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS, WORLD

REP. 2001, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2kl/africa/drc.html (reporting that the DR Congo
was engaged in armed conflict); see also CentralAfricanRepublic Profile-Timeline,BBC
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13150044 (reporting that the

Central African Republic was subject to peacekeeping missions and mutinies from soldiers
in the late 1990s); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, Burma: Human Rights Developments,
WORLD REP. 2001, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2kl/asia/burma.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2018) (reporting that Burma was engaged in armed conflict); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH,
Sierra Leone, WORLD REP. 2001, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2kl/africa/sierraleone2.html

(last visited Nov. 12, 2018) (reporting that Sierra Leone had recently signed the Lom Peace
Accord, ending its civil war).
2.
3.

WHO, supra note 1.
Nigeria'sLow Ranking in Global HealthcareIndex, GUARDIAN (Jun. 6, 2017),

https://guardian.ng/opinion/nigerias-low-ranking-in-global-healthcare-index/ (stating that the
results showing Nigeria came 140 th in the WHO's healthcare rankings only reinforced what
Nigerians knew about the state of health care services in the country).
4.
Id.
5.
World Health Org., Nigeria, GLOBAL HEALTH WORKFORCE ALLIANCE (last visited
Oct. 16, 2018), http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/countries/nga/en/ (stating that Nigeria

still struggles with inequitable distribution of health workers and quality health care
delivery); Daniel H. Kress, Yanfang Su, & Hong Wang, Assessment ofPrimary Health Care
System Performance in Nigeria: Using the Primary Health CarePerformance Indicator
ConceptualFramework, 2 HEALTH SYss. REFORM 302, 302 (2016); GUARDIAN supra note 3.
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largest economy in the region.B Yet, the health status of its population does
not reflect these advantages.9 In fact, in most major dimensions of human
wellbeing, the country grossly underperforms relative to other countries.0
For instance, the aggregated life expectancy at birth in Nigeria stands at 54.5
years - better than only six countries in Africa (Lesotho, Ivory Coast, Chad,
Central African Republic, Angola and Sierra Leone).
Maternal health in the country is even more appalling. Although the
maternal mortality ratio (MMR) - the number of maternal deaths per 100,000
live births - declined to 216 globally in 2015,0 the number veered in the
opposite direction to 814 in Nigeria, which was superior to only three
countries in Africa. 1 This is hardly surprising given the country's low level
of access to skilled birth attendants (SBAs), a key indicator of maternal
health. 5 Consequently, even though seventy-three percent of births globally
were assisted by a midwife, nurse or physician in 2013, the rate was only
thirty-five percent in Nigeria between 2006 and 2014.0 This particular
challenge - the dire shortage of SBAs in the country - is a significant booster
of the national MMR.0 Relatedly, the country is also underperforming with
respect to child mortality.0 The current global under-five mortality rate is
42.5 deaths per 1,000 live births,0 but in Nigeria, the rate (including neonatal

6.

IMF Affirms Nigeria as Africa's Biggest Economy, THIS DAY (Oct. 20, 2016),

https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/10/20/imf-affirms-nigeria-as-africas-biggesteconomy-2/.
7.
GUARDIAN, supra note 3.
8.
ToYi OLANIYAN, RESEARCHGATE, THE HEALTH STATUS IN NIGERIA AND THE
NIGERIAN HEALTH SYSTEM 1-2 (November 2012) (stating that there are significant disparities

between rural and urban areas in health outcomes as well as limited access to clean water
and sanitation); Nigeria, HAPPYPLANET INDEX (Nov. 11, 2017, 8:08 AM),

http://happyplanetindex.org/countries/nigeria.
9.
World health statistics 2016: Monitoring Health for the SDGs, Sustainable
Development Goals 8 (2016) [hereinafter Monitoring Health] (providing a figure which
shows the life expectancy at birth for countries around the world organized by region and
ranked highest to lowest age).
10.
11.

Monitoring Health, supra note 9, at 44.
Id at 45.

12. Id. at 47 (The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel in Nigeria is
higher than only five other African countries).
13.
Id at 46.
14.
Id. at 47.
15.
Peter Nkwo et al., PoorAvailability ofSkilled Birth Attendants in Nigeria:A Case
Study ofEnugu State PrimaryHealth Care System, 5 ANNALS MED. HEALTH SCI. RES., 20,

20 (2015) (stating that availability of SBAs is pivotal to achieving the fifth Millennium
Development Goal (MDG), which is to improve maternal health).
16. Monitoring Health, supra note 9, at 48-49 (providing data showing that Nigeria had
an under-five mortality rate of 108.8 per 1000 live births in 2015 compared to the global
mortality rate of 42.5 per 1000 live births).
17.
Id at 48.
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deaths) is abysmally high, at 109 deaths.0 The national record is equally
disconcerting in other key areas of health such as rates of tuberculosis,
malaria and hepatitis B vaccination. 5
Although multiple factors account for the poor performance of the health
system in Nigeria, access issues relating to health care costs is the most
critical.
Though Nigeria is endowed with greater human and material
resources than others in the region, its over-dependence on oil, deeply
embedded institutional and structural ineptitudes, and decades of brazen
economic profligacy, leakages and mismanagement have combined to foist
untold hardship on the citizenry. 5 Poverty wields a menacing stranglehold
on the country, with more than half of the population (53.5 percent) surviving
on less than $1.90 per day and, therefore, unable to access health care
services. 5 This situation demands a radically different approach. Even
before the publication of the WHO Report in 2000, the political leadership of
the country had begun to lay the foundation for a risk-sharing arrangement to
replace the extant financing mechanism in the country (user fees), which
were blamed for access to health care barriers throughout the country. 5
The idea of health insurance first surfaced in 1962, but was quickly
shelved due to an inability to generate widespread support, which was not
totally surprising given the readily available free or subsidized services at
public hospitals at that time. 5 The economic shock brought about by the
18.

Id at 49.

19. Id at 52-57 (providing data showing that the global TB incidence per 100,000
population was 133 compared to 322 in Nigeria (2014), the global incidence of malaria per
1000 population at risk was 91 (2015) compared to 343 in Nigeria (2013), and only 66% of
infants in Nigeria receive three doses of the hepatitis B vaccination (2014)).
20.
O.C. Uchendu, 0.S. Ilesanni & A.E. Olumide, FactorsInfluencing the Choice of
Health Care ProvidingFacilityAmong Workers in a Local Government Secretariatin South
Western Nigeria, 11 ANNALS IBADAN POSTGRADUATE MED. 87, 87 (2013).
21. Mapping Africa's naturalresources: An overview of the continent's main natural
resources, AL JAZEERA, Feb. 20, 2018,

https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/10/mapping-africa-natural-resources161020075811145.html; see generally Nigeria'sCorruption Challenge, TRANSPARENCY
INT'L (2015) https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/nigeriascorruption challenge, (last
visited Nov. 12, 2018, 8:39 AM) ("Corruption hits hardest at the poor in Nigeria who make
up more than 40 per cent of the 179 million people. Global Financial Integrity estimates
more than US$157 billion in the past decade has left the country illicitly. Corruption is
everywhere: even the health and medical services, considered the least corrupt government
institution, are considered very corrupt by 41 percent of Nigerians.")
22.

SELIM JAHAN, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

REPORT 2016: HuMAN DEVELOPMENT FOR EVERYONE 219 (2016); see also Nigeria, supra
note 5.

23.

KG. Gsungbade et al., Social Health Insurance in Nigeria:Policy Implicationsin a

Rural Community, 57 NIGERIAN MED. PRACTITIONER 90, 90 (2010).

24.
Isaac AO Odeyemi & John Nixon, Assessing Equity in Health Care Through the
NationalHealth Insurance Schemes ofNigeria and Ghana: A Review-Based Comparative
Analysis, 12 J. FOR EQUITY IN HEALTH 1, 2 (2013).
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global oil glut of the 1980s and subsequent imposition of user fees sent
policymakers back to the drawing board, desperate for a change in health care
financing in the country.0 Consequently, in 1984, the National Council on
Health, the highest policy-makin body on health, resurrected the idea of
health insurance in the country.
Following extensive consultations with
various stakeholders from different sectors of the economy, the National
Health Insurance Scheme (Scheme) Decree 35 of 1999 established a SHI
system of health care financing in Nigeria.0 The Scheme is predicated on a
public-private sector partnership - a shared responsibility between the
people and the government for financing the health system - with the
ultimate purpose of achieving UHC.0
WHO defines UHC as "access to key promotive, preventive, curative and
rehabilitative health interventions for all at an affordable cost" meaning,
equitable access to health services without being subjected to financial
hardship.0 These are the two critical benchmarks that countries committed
to UHC, such as Nigeria, must strive to attain. Nonetheless, despite the
urgency of the country's situation, the Scheme was not implemented until
June 2005 due to challenges associated with logistics and widespread
skepticism regarding the Scheme's operation0
Implementation regulations are contained in the NHIS Operational
Guidelines (Guidelines), which were adopted in 2005 and revised in 2012, to
improve the efficiency and viability of the Scheme's various programs.0
The current Guidelines merge existing programs into three broad categories:
(1) the formal sector social health insurance program, (2) the informal sector
social health insurance program, and (3) the vulnerable group social health
insurance program. 5 However, despite being implemented for the last
25.
Id
26.
Obiajulu Nnamuchi, The NigerianSocial Health InsuranceSystem and the
Challenges ofAccess to Health Care:An Antidote or a White Elephant?, 28 MED. AND LAW

125, 128 (2009) (analyzing whether the National Health Insurance Scheme of Nigeria has
prospects for ensuring access to affordable health care for every Nigerian).
27.
The National Health Insurance Scheme Decree 35 of 1999 is now referred to as an
Act, rather than Decree. See National Health Insurance Scheme Act (Act No. 3 5/1999), § 1
(Nigeria).
28.

Id at§ 5.

29. World Health Org., Social Health Insurance Sustainable Health Financing,
Universal Coverage And Social Health Insurance, A58/20, Apr. 7, 2015 [hereinafter World
Health Org.]; see also World Health Org., The World Health Report Health Systems
Financing The Path to Universal Coverage, 2010 [hereinafter World Health Report 2010].
30.
Chima A. Onoka et al., Towards Universal Coverage:A Policy Analysis of the
Development of the NationalHealth Insurance Scheme in Nigeria, 30 HEALTH POL'Y AND
PLANNING 1105, 1109-10 (2014) (explaining that initial attempts to commence the program

were constrained by changes in the policy environment and stakeholder positions because of
several contentious issues).
31.

NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES (Oct. 2012).

32.

Id
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thirteen years, the NHIS' impact remains monstrously epileptic and covers
merely three percent of the population. 5
The low coverage rate in Nigeria sharply contrasts with the performances
in other countries that operate SHI systems across Africa, notably Rwanda
and Ghana. 0 Rwanda and Ghana are appropriate comparators because, aside
from sharing regional affinity, both nations implemented SHI Schemes
within the same relative time period as Nigeria; yet, Rwanda and Ghana are
markedly separated by different levels of attainment.0 Ghana implemented
its own NHIS in 2004, just a year before Ni eria, following the enactment of
its National Health Insurance Act in 2003. Remarkably, the coverage rate
in Ghana rose to thirty-three percent of the population in 2010, and forty
percent at the end of2015.0 Rising concern about efficiency, transparency,
and corruption triggered the enactment of a new statute in 2012, the National
Health Insurance Act (Act 852), to replace the 2003 Act.8 Act 852 quite
clearly mandates that regulations, notices, directions, or any other act
lawfully enacted under the previous statute shall remain in effect until
revoked.0 The new statute merges all existing District Mutual Health
Insurance Schemes (DMHIS) to form a nationwide NHIS, to which every
Ghanaian must belong.f
Rwanda's health insurance system that covers those outside the formal
sector is anchored on a community-based health insurance (CBHI) program
known as "Mutuelle de Sant." Although the country utilizes two other

33.

Adie Vanessa Offiong, Nigeriansand the NHIS challenge, Daily Trust (Dec. 10,

2016), https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/nigerians-and-the-nhis-challenge.html.
34.
Eniola Akinkuotu, Health Care: WHO Asks Nigeria To Emulate Rwanda, Ghana,
PUNCH NEWS (Apr. 8, 2018), https://punchng.com/health-care-who-asks-nigeria-to-emulate-

rwanda-ghana/.
35.
Benjamin Chemouni, The PoliticalPath to Universal Health Coverage: Power,
Ideas and Community-BasedHealth Insurance in Rwanda, 106 WORLD DEV. 87, 88 (2018)

(explaining performance of health coverage between Rwanda, Ghana, and Nigeria).
36.
Anthony Kusi et al., Refusal to Enrollin Ghana'sNationalHealth Insurance
Scheme: Is Affordability the Problem?, 14 Int'l J. for Equity in Health 1, 2 (2015) (explaining

that Ghana began the implementation of a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in
2004 as a way to ensure equitable access to basic healthcare for all residents).
37.
Health InsuranceProfile: Ghana, AFRICAN STRATEGIES FOR HEALTH (Feb. 2016),
http://www.africanstrategies4health.org/uploads/1/3/5/3/1353 8666/countryprofile-

ghana - us letter.pdf.
38.
N.H.I.A., NAT'L HEALTH INS. SCHEME, http://www.lis.gov.gh/nhia.aspx (last
visited Oct. 18, 2018).
39.
National Health Insurance Act (Act No. 852/2012), § 110 (Ghana).
40.
National Health Insurance Act (Act No. 650/2003), § 31 (Ghana); see also Id. § 27
(1); see also Anthony Kusi et al., supra note 36, at 3.
41.
Andrew Makaka, et al., Universal Health Coverage in Rwanda: A Report of
Innovations to Increase Enrollment in Community-BasedHealth Insurance, THE LANCET
(Oct. 21, 2012), http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(13)60293-

7.pdf.
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health insurance programs,0 this article focuses on the CBHI Scheme. This
focus is based on the fact that the Rwandan CBHI Scheme provides coverage
to the vast majority of the population.0 The program resulted from a pilot
project, which began in 1999 and was adopted as a national policy in 2004.0
In 2011, Rwanda witnessed a comprehensive insurance reform which
transformed the Mutuelle de Santd to an income-based premium payment
system.0 Tiered progressive premium payments, coupled with a 2008 legal
requirement that residents of the country affiliate with a health insurance
scheme,0 are perhaps the major driving forces behind the scaling up of
Rwanda's health insurance. Ultimately, these aspects make Rwanda the best
success story in Africa, with coverage rates exceeding ninety percent of the
population in 2010-11,0 although declining to seventy-five percent in
2015.0
Institutionalizing a prepayment system of health care financing is a
response to the severe financial hardship that is often commonplace in a user
fees system.0 The idea is to provide protection against health-related
financial catastrophe or impoverishment - defined as paying over forty
percent of household income directly on health care after satisfying basic
needs.0 The growing problem of health-related financial catastrophes
affects 150 million people globally, and forces 100 million into poverty.El
The NHIS in Nigeria, like similar programs in other countries, aims to
address this problem by positioning the country on a path to UHC by
establishing various health programs through which residents may access
health services. 5 But these efforts have come with some serious hurdles.
42. World Health Report 2010, supra note 29, at 7 (discussing Rwanda's two health
insurance programs as (1) the Rwandaise assurance malady, which is a SHI providing
coverage to government and private-sector employees; and (2) the Military Medical
Insurance scheme, in which all military personnel are enrolled).
43. Makaka et al., supra note 41.
44.
Chunling Lu et al., Towards Universal Health Coverage:An Evaluation ofRwanda
Mutuelles in its FirstEight Years, 7 PLOs ONE 1, 2 (2012) (explaining how the success of the
pilot motivated the local governments and communities to quickly adopt and expand the
program nationwide).
45.
Id.
46. Mddard Nyandekwe et al., Universal Health Coverage in Rwanda: Dream or
Reality, 17 PAN AFRICAN MED. J., 232, 234 (2014) (reviewing Rwanda's financial

sustainability in relation to its universal health coverage).
47.

Health InsuranceProfile: Rwanda, AFRICAN STRATEGIES FOR HEALTH (Feb. 2016),

http://www.africanstrategies4health.org/uploads/1/3/5/3/1353 8666/countryprofilerwanda_-_us_letter.pdf.
48. Id
49. World Health Organization, Monitoring the Building Blocks of Health Systems: A
Handbook of Indicators and their Measurement Strategies, 2010.
50. World Health Report 2010, supra note 29, at 5.
51. Id at 9.
52. National Health Insurance Scheme Guidelines, supra note 31, at 3.
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This article analyzes these hurdles or the various factors that frustrate efforts
to attain UHC in Nigeria. This task is grounded in intercountry discourse
a comparative endeavor that seeks to transplant knowledge gained from the
experiences in Ghana and Rwanda to Nigeria. It is not coincidental that a
twenty-two-member delegation from Sierra Leone embarked on a two-day
visit to the NHIS of Ghana to understudy its operations;0 as did a sixmember delegation from Mali, which spent five days in the country.0
Similarly, many sub-Saharan and South Asian countries have sent delegates
to study the Rwandan health insurance system.
Underlying these visits to Rwanda and Ghana is the intention to use the
lessons learned to improve the health insurance schemes of other countries.
This suggests that this paper, although primarily focused on Nigeria, could
be beneficial to other countries in Africa and to countries elsewhere that are
invested in relying on a SHI system of health care financing to achieve
UHC.0 While laudatory of Rwanda's and Ghana's successes, this article
equally recognizes the external and internal challenges that impede optimal
performance in the two countries. For example, Ghana's NHIS struggles
against inadequate logistics and infrastructure, as well as inadequate human
resources.0 However, this article does not dwell on these challenges,
because they are typical of most emerging health systems. Instead, the article
focuses on those key challenges from which the experiences of better
performing SHI systems, like those of Rwanda and Ghana, could be
harnessed and used to improve their underperforming counterparts,
specifically in Nigeria.
This article consists of three sections. Following the Introduction, Part II
explores the obstacles to scaling up SHI in Nigeria. This section projects five
factors as the most critical: poor sensitization and mobilization campaigns,
unavailability of health services to enrollees, corruption and its impact on
enrollment, non-compulsory enrollment, and poverty as a barrier to
enrollment. The goal is to explore the challenges that are stifling progress in
Nigeria, as well as strategies that have worked in other countries, specifically
Rwanda and Ghana, and to make a case for transplanting those strategies to
Nigeria. The Conclusion, Part III, highlights the complexity of health policy
53.
Ghana'sHealth Insurance Scheme Receives Praisesfrom Visiting SierraLeone
Delegation, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME (Aug. 31, 2017),

http://www.nliis.gov.gh/News/ghana%/`E2%/`80%/`99s-health-insurance-scheme-receivespraises-from-visiting-sierra-leone-delegation-4129.
54.
Malian Delegation UnderstudiesNHIS, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME
(Aug. 29, 2017), http://www.nhis.gov.gh/News/malian-delegation-understudies-nhis-4128.
55.
Makaka et al., supra note 41.
56.
Id.
57.
GISSELE GAJATE-GARRIDO & REBECCA OWUSUA, INT'L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH
INST., THE NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME IN GHANA: IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 10 (2013).
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implementation in third world countries and urges a retooling or recalibration
of Nigeria's NHIS by tackling the issues that were identified as responsible
for its underperformance.
II. CHALLENGES TO NIGERIA'S NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME
AND LESSONS FROM RWANDA AND GHANA

A. Inadequate Sensitization andMobilization Campaign
Creating public awareness, specifically by dedicating adequate resources to
sensitization and mobilization campaigns, has been identified as essential to
the realization of the goal of government-initiated programs, particularly those
requiring financial contribution from the people, like SHI schemes. 5 This is
especially critical in a country like Nigeria, where there is a high degree of
distrust of the government due to decades of irresponsible leadership and
financial recklessness on the part of public officials entrusted with
management of public resources.
Cognizant of this divide, a reasonable
measure in Nigeria would have been an intensive effort to gain public support
before unveiling the NHIS in the country; that is, saturating the airwaves with
vital information about the Scheme's operation and its impact on access to
health services. 9 Yet, quite inexplicably, no such heavy lifting was done.0
The unintended, but visible, consequences of this grave omission are the
apathy, misconception, and continued distancing of the vast majority of the
population from participating in the Scheme. 5 Knowledge deficits do not
attract participation in any program, particularly government-sponsored
programs, which explains the dismal level of enrollment and the current
underperformance of the NHIS.0 The story is quite different in comparable
countries.
In Ghana, dedicating resources to public sensitization programs regardin
SHI and its operation is yielding tremendous benefits for Ghana's residents.6
In a 2008 household survey, more than seventy percent of respondents
affirmed that participation in the NHIS afforded them access to health
services at a cheaper cost. 5 Knowledge levels are high, at 78.8 percent of

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Nnamuchi, supra note 26, at 159.
Id at 160.
Id
Id at 151.
Id
Idat 160, 163.

64.
2008 Citizens' Assessment of the National Health Insurance Scheme: Towards a
Sustainable Health Care Financing Arrangement, Nat'l Dev. Planning Comm'n 41, 56
(2009).
65.
Id at 48.
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the population, 9 with nearly sixty-eight percent of households identifying
radio as their main source of information, while television programing and
information from neighbors, friends, and local associations/communitybased organizations account for 8.2, eleven, and 2.2 percent, respectively, of
the sources of information for the remainder of the population. 5 The
likelihood of sustaining this momentum is great given policymakers'
renewed efforts to continue providing more information and education to
providers, clients, and the general public through intensive media campaigns,
which would cover the operations of the Scheme and the activities of the
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA). 5
In Rwanda, aside from initial mobilization efforts, which were credited
with creating a surge in the number of enrollees, declining enrollment
recently triggered a fresh round of mobilization campaigns - including a
month-long national campaign under the leadership of the country's Prime
Minister, Anastase Murekezi, and fresh rounds of sensitization campaigns
aimed at creating better appreciation of health insurance among the people. 5
Reports indicate that "people are comfortable with Mutuelle de Santd because
of the thorough sensitization about its advantages."O Local leaders and
45,000 community health-care workers recently received incentives to
increase individual enrollment in the CBHI program.5
In 2015, the
government disclosed that a plan was underway to take awareness campaigns
to the communities, and to bring registration services closer to the people.
B. Denial ofServices to Enrollees and its Impact on the Scheme
A crucial factor driving enrollment in health insurance is the belief or
knowledge that services will be available when illness strikes. 5 After all, the
sole reason for gaining coverage is to ensure that lack of funds does not
impede accessing health care services when the need arises. 5 Yet, quite
often, this hope does not materialize for enrollees under Nigeria's NHIS.0

-

66. Id at 55.
67. Id at 41.
68. See e.g., Health InsuranceProfile: Ghana., supra note 37 (reporting Ghana's health
insurance profile, including how it is financed and the package benefits).
69. Republic of Rwanda, Government ofRwanda Launches 'Mutuelle de Sante'
Campaign, Gov'T REP. OF RWANDA (Sept. 29, 2015),
http://www.gov.rw/newsdetail/?txttnews%5Bttnews%5D= 1325&cHash=9f0657b5da72c
Of9dbc11322e13ea6a3; see also Solomon Asaba, Exploring Rwanda's Health Insurance
Scheme, New Times (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/195449/.
70.
Asaba, supra note 69.
71. Makaka et al., supra note 41.
72.
Asaba, supra note 69.
73. Id. at 5, 6.
74. Id. at 6.
75. See e.g Agency Report, NHIS Expels 23, 000 Fake Enrollees in Three Months
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Health establishments routinely deny beneficiaries services due to nonreceipt of payment from Health Maintenance Organizations fHMOs), despite
having been paid three months in advance by the NHIS.0 The result is
atrocious. For instance, one report indicates that Nigeria loses seventy
newborn babies and 100 women every day, notwithstanding coverage under
the NHIS. In addition, HMOs have been found to be submitting names of
thousands of fake enrollees for which payment was made by the Scheme - a
key reason these organizations have been described as "blood sucking
monsters" and "the problem of the NHIS".E This causes continued access
difficulties, which negates the reason for NHIS' establishment, and causes
concomitant loss of confidence in the Scheme's operation.0
In Ghana, the situation is markedly different. For instance, while the rate
of births attended by SBAs in Nigeria stagnates at thirty-five percent,O the
figure in Ghana has risen to seventy-one percent, up from just fifty percent
in 2006.El This increase indicates that SHI in Ghana has significantly boosted
pregnant women's access to health care services and positively impacted
maternal survival rates in the country.E The MMR in Ghana stands at 319
deaths per one hundred thousand live births, compared to 814 in Nigeria.E
These differences account for the disparate perspectives in the two countries
regarding the impact of health insurance in the respective countries.
Dissatisfaction is rife in Nigeria, whereas the reverse is true in Ghana, with
approximately ninety-two percent of enrollees reportin that they are
satisfied or very satisfied with the Scheme's performance.U
Similar confidence is seen in Rwanda, as can be gleaned from this
assertion by a health insurance provider in that country, to wit, the vast
majority of the "people are comfortable with Mutuelle de Santd" on account

Executive Secretary, PREMIUM TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017),
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/229 184-nhis-expels-23000-fake-enrollees-

three-months-executivesecretary.html?relatedpostshit= 1&relatedposts origin=236186&relatedposts-position=3
(describing how Health Maintenance Organizations increased the number of enrollees
reported to obtain higher monthly NHIS payments).
76.
77.

Id.
Judd-Leonard Okafor, Scandals rock NHIS as FG Suspends Boss, Daily Trust (July

8, 2016, 2:00 AM), https://dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/scandals-rock-nhis-as-fgsuspends-boss/204538.htiil.
78.
79.
80.
81.
at 34.
82.
83.
84.

Agency Report supra note 75; see also Okafor, supra note 77.
Agency Report supra note 75.
WHO, supra note 9, at 108.
WHO, supra note 9, at 106; see also Nat'l Dev. Planning Comm'n, supra note 64,
Nat'l Dev. Planning Commn'n, supranote 64, at 34.
WHO, supra note 9, at 106, 108.
Nat'l Dev. Planning Commn'n, supra note 64, at 52.
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of the widespread knowledge about its benefits.0 An enrollee recently
affirmed, "without Mutuelle de Santd, hospital bills would be
unmanageable." 9 This degree of confidence is remarkable because the
ability to afford or manage health care costs is one of the reasons for the steep
decline in the rate of infant and maternal mortality in Rwanda, assuring its
place among the few African countries to attain the relevant benchmarks of
the Millennium Development Goals.0
C. Corruptionand its Impact on the Psyche ofPotentialEnrollees
In the third quarter of 2017, the Health Minister suspended Executive
Secretary of Nigeria's NHIS, the Chief Executive Officer of the Scheme,
Usman Yusuf, over allegations of fraud.0 His alleged transgressions
included unauthorized acquisition of a luxury vehicle at a grossly inflated
price, awarding contracts without adherence to pre-existing procedures at
figures that were multiple times over prevailing market rates, as well as
granting himself immunity from prosecution on the basis of his closeness to
the Nigerian President.0 The suspension came barely a year after he
assumed office,O and his proclamation that his "mandate at the [NHIS],"
namely, "to design and implement strategies and instruments that will make
[the Scheme] a good steward of the nation's commonwealth . . will have no
place for vices and distractions like corruption, inefficiency, impunity and
political patronage."O This was quite a startling, paradoxical development.
Regardless of the authenticity of these allegations or the paradoxical
nature of the events at the leadership or management level of Nigeria's
NHIS,O a disturbing reality is that the situation does not augur well for the
Scheme, especially considering that the two prior executive secretaries

85.
86.

Asaba, supra note 69.
Id.

87.

Id.

-

88. Malik Abdulganiy, The Insider: How N58m SUVLandedNHISES In Trouble
And EarnedHim Suspension, THE CABLE (July 7, 2017), https://www.thecable.ng/insidern58m-suv-landed-nhis-es-trouble-suspension; see also National Health Insurance Scheme
Act (Act No. 3 5/1999), § 1 (Nigeria).
89.
Abdulganiy, supra note 88.
90.
Abbas Jimoh & Akor Ojoma, Shake-up as BuhariAppoints New Heads ofHealth
Agencies, WEEKLY TRUST, (July 30, 2016) https://www.pressreader.com/nigeria/weeklytrust/20160730/281586649966666.
91.
Chukwuma Muanya, NHISRe-Strategises to Provide Cheaper Services for Informal
Sector, THE GUARDIAN, (Aug. 21, 2016) https://guardian.ng/saturday-magazine/cover/nhisre-strategises-to-provide-cheaper-services-for-informal-sector/.
92. See e.g., Levinus Nwabughiogu, Suspension ofNHIS Boss by Health Minister is
Witch Hunt, VANGUARD NEWS, (July 16, 2017)

https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/07/suspension-nhis-boss-health-minister-witch-hunthon-chike-okafor/.
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presently face corruption charges.0 Specifically, one is being investigated
by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) for money
laundering in the amount of nearly $2.2 million,0 while the other is charged
with fraud, embezzlement, and misconduct in office.0 They are also being
prosecuted by the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences
Commission (ICPC) for fraud connected with funds belonging to the
Scheme.0 In a report entitled "Corruption Practices and Abuse of Office in
NHIS," published in the last quarter of 2015, the ICPC found the two
aforementioned officials culpable of "abuse of office: flagrant abuse of
financial rules and the regulations; executive rascality: embezzlement of
public funds and monumental diversion of government funds."O A news
article report was even more virulent, accusing the two of being "neck-deep
in the systematic creation and manifestation of ghost enrollees in the scheme
at a staggering cost" to the health sector and the country.3 This abuse is
quite disturbing because it dampens public enthusiasm in the public-private
partnership that the Scheme represents, a factor that one of the authors of this
article identifies in a related publication as a reason for extant lowenrollment, particularly in the informal sector:
It is no secret that government projects usually come to naught due, in most
cases, to misappropriation of budgeted funds by public officials.
Corruption is endemic in Nigeria and, as more fully argued elsewhere, is
at the core of many of the challenges stifling the development of the
country... Health care is no exception. Seen this way, it becomes easy to
understand why people are reluctant to buy into an insurance scheme
operated by a government that has done little to earn public trust. There is
no guarantee that contributions squeaked out by the people would not wind
up in some private bank accounts but will
fact be used to provide health
care to the contributors as the need arises.U

The point is that even if other challenges bedeviling the Scheme are
expurgated, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to engineer large-scale
enrollment in the absence of a commitment to eradicate corruption in the
93.
Nnenna Ibeh, $2.2m Seized Cash: FormerNHIS Boss Turns Himself in to EFCC,
PREMIUM TIMES, (Aug. 7, 2015) http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/1 88017-22m-seized-cash-former-nhis-boss-turns-himself-in-to-efcc.html; see also NHISBoss, Femi
Akingbade in Trouble over Multi-Million NairaFraud, THE ICON
http://theicon.ng/2016/03/03/nhis-boss-femi-akingbade-in-trouble-over-multi-million-nairafraud/ (last visited on Oct. 17, 2018).
94.
Ibeh, supra note 93.
95.

THE ICON, supra note 93.

96. ICPCto Prosecute NHIS Boss Over Fraud, DAILY TRUST (Mar. 17, 2016),
https://www.pressreader.com/nigeria/daily-trust/20160317/281487865462086.
97. Id
98. Id.
99. Nnamuchi, supra note 26, at 160.
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operation of the NHIS. While the current Executive Secretary denies his
suspension in the media,10 the Health Minister appointed a replacement, in
acting capacity.E Although the wisdom of the Health Minister's actions is
not in dispute, the instability generated by constant changes at the highest
echelon of the NHIS administration does not bode well for the Scheme.0
Aside from funds lost and its impact on performance and provision of
services, instability implies unsustainability, which hardly incentivizes
uptake of coverage, thereby contributing to further erosion of confidence in
the Scheme.
In this context, there is a need to consider the situation in other countries.
Admittedly, the NHIS in Ghana is not corruption-free,E and neither is the
insurance program in Rwanda.0 Nevertheless, the pervasiveness and
impact are not as pronounced compared to the scenario in Nigeria. There
have been reports in Ghana of informal payments, such as charging for
services provided during unofficial hours, and demanding payment for outof-stock drugs and/or drugs not listed in the government's Essential Drug
List, which affects up to forty percent ofthe insured population.0 Similarly,
Rwanda has also battled corruption, but its key challenges are of a different
genre, ranging from infusing efficiency to financial management, addressing
the affordability of premiums for the poorest citizens, and scaling up the
range of services available while reducing out-of-pocket costs.B
D. Non-Compulsory Enrollment
A peculiar feature of Nigeria's NHIS is its non-compulsory enrollment,
except for formal sector employees.0 Formal sector employees refer to civil
servants and those employed in medium/large companies whereas those
engaged in small-scale businesses, such as petty traders, farmers, and
artisans, operate in the informal sector. Those in the informal sector are at
liberty to enroll or not enroll.
Non-compulsory enrollment of the informal
sector's population is one of the major factors responsible for the low

100.
Ayodamola Owoseye, Suspended Nigeria NHIS Chief Yet to HandOver, PREMIUM
TIMES (July 7, 2017), http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/236186-

suspended-nigeria-nhis-chief-yet-hand.html.
101.
Abuja Vincent Ikuomola, NHIS gets acting Executive Secretary, THE NATION (July
11, 2017), http://thenationonlineng.net/nhis-gets-acting-executive-secretary/.
102.
Nnamuchi, supra note 26, at 156.
103.
Id.
104.
Asaba, supra note 69.
105.

WHO, OBSTACLES IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING SUSTAINABLE NATIONAL

HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME: INSIGHTS FROM GHANA 3 (March 2010),

http://www.who.int/health financing/pbe_10_01 -ghana-nhis.pdf?ua= 1.
106.
107.
108.

World Health Report 2010, supra note 29.
Offiong, supra note 33.
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coverage rate in the country.P As to the benefit of compulsory enrollment,
health policy expert, Felix Abrahams Obi, opines that "everyone will be
insured," resulting in a "risk pool large enough to provide a robust benefit
package"; whereas voluntary participation encourages adverse selection - in
the sense of incentivizing enrollment when people are ill and in need of
coverage.E The result would be large numbers of sick enrollees and
abnormally hi h rates of expenditure, which, if left unchecked, could bankrupt
the program.
Recently, one of the states in Nigeria, Oyo, ado ted a statute which makes
health insurance compulsory for all of its residents.
When fully operational,
the state health insurance program will provide free coverage to pregnant
women, vulnerable groups, and children under five years old.J
A
significant feature of the program is its premium prices, estimated to be
approximately $2 per month or $21 annually, depending on the payment
preference of the enrollee. 5 The point is that health sector successes do not
need to be driven by the central government; at times, as in this case, NHIS
could learn from the example of a component of the federating unit. Needless
to add that enrollment is compulsory in Ghana, 5 and, in Rwanda, Law No
62/2007 makes affiliation with a health insurance scheme mandatory for all
residents. 2
E. Poverty as an EnrollmentBarrier
The extent to which poverty poses a challenge to enrollment under an SHI
system depends on the cost of contributions that households are required to
make to the health insurance program.E The contribution is considered

109.

Id.

110.

Id.

111.
John Hansen, It's the Sick People CausingAll the Problems, HEALTH FOR
CALIFORNIA INSURANCE CENTER (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.healthforcalifornia.com/sick-

people-causing-problems.
-

112.
Adebayo Waheed, Health Insurance Scheme Now MandatoryFor Oyo Residents
Ajimobi, Leadership (June 8, 2017), http://leadership.ng/2017/06/08/health-insurancescheme-now-mandatory-oyo-residents-ajimobi/; see generally OYo STATE HEALTH
INSURANCE AGENCY, Our Core Values, http://oyshia.oy.gov.ng/what-we-do (last visited

Sept. 7, 2018) (showing, through the Oyo State Health Insurance Law of 216, that healthcare
for all is an important core value of the State).
113.

Waheed, supra note 112.

114.

Id. (explaining that the premiums depending on preferred payment method will

either be 650 Naira ($1.79 US Currency) or 7,800 Naira ($21.46 US Currency)).
115.
National Health Insurance Scheme Act No. 852, §27 (1) (2012) (Ghana); accord

National Health Insurance Scheme Act (2003) § 31 (Ghana) (reinforcing that enrollment in a
health insurance scheme is mandatory).
116.

Nyandekwe et al., supra note 46, at 2.

117.
Kusi et al., supra note 36, at 4 (describing how affordability of insurance is
influenced by over-all household income).
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affordable if purchasing health insurance leaves sufficient income to meet
other socially defined minimum essential requirements of life. 5 This means
that sometimes health insurance would be affordable to socioeconomically
disadvantaged households insofar as the amount expended does not deprive
the household of funds needed to purchase other things that are essential to
sustaining life. 5 Governments should be mindful of this when fixing the
price of contributions payable to the health insurance pool. Equally
noteworthy in projecting poverty as an impediment to participating in a SHI
scheme is the fact that raw poverty measures do not correlate to enrollment,
as other factors might turn the tide the opposite direction. The poverty rate
in Rwanda is higher than in Nigeria, at 60.4 and 53.5 percent respectively;E
yet, Rwanda provides better access to health care through effective and
efficient SHI management; 5 meaning that the reason for Nigeria's low
performance is not necessarily poverty-driven. As key issues pinpointed in
this discourse demonstrate, the reasons for Nigeria's low performance are
much deeper and multifaceted, 5 and these same reasons explain why
Ghana's coverage rate is lower than Rwanda's even though the poverty rate
in the former is much lower, at 25.2 percent.f Often, the decisive factor in
rates of participation in SHI schemes is whether the government provides
premium subsidies or exempts some of the participants in the informal sector,
particularly the poor, from making contributions.
In Ghana, poverty is a major challenge to enrollment.
Disaggregated data
on the country's NHIS subscription among socioeconomic groups portrays
the lowest enrollment among the poor.W- Out of every ten people in the
118.
Id. (defining health insurance as affordable if after purchase a household still
retains enough income to meet minimum necessities required for living).
119.
Id. (explaining the 'budget-based approach to affordability' where insurance
affordability is based on the over-all household income).
120.
SELIM JAHAN, supra note 22, at 219 (reporting the population percentage living
below income poverty line at purchasing power parity (PPP) of $1.90 a day).
121. Id. (reporting a 29.8% health contribution to deprivation in dimension to overall
poverty in Nigeria, and 18.4% contribution in Rwanda).
122.
Kusi et al., supra note 36, at 4.
123.
SELIM JAHAN, supra note 22, at 218-19 (reporting percentage living below income
poverty converted to PPPs at 25.2% in Ghana, and 60.4% in Rwanda); see also Chemouni

supra note 35, at 88 (reporting coverage rates at 81.6% under CBHI, and 87% including
other insurance in Rwanda, and 38% coverage in Ghana); see Id. (reporting multi-faceted
monetary and nomnonetary variables in Ghana).
124.
GHANA STAT. SERV., GHANA HEALTH SERV., GHANA DEMOGRAPHIC & HEALTH
SURV. 2008 48-49 (2009) (illustrating the large percentile difference in enrollment between
both men and women from the lowest wealth quintile and highest wealth quintile).
125.
Id. (reporting percentage distribution of individuals enrolled in the
National/District Health Insurance scheme at 29.3% of women in the lowest wealth quintile
compared to 47% of women in the highest wealth quintile, and 16.6% of men in the lowest
wealth quintile compared to men at 37.7% in the highest wealth quintile); see also
ARIN DUTTA & CHARLES HONGORO, HEALTH POLICY PROJECT, SCALING UP NATIONAL
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lowest socioeconomic group, only about three are registered with the
Scheme.E A recent study reports that about sixty-four percent of the
uninsured and forty-seven percent of the partially insured households
attribute non-enrollment with the NHIS to costs they cannot afford.0 The
link between affordability and enrollment is illustrated by a finding that fully
insured households have the lowest annual NHIS contribution (Gh C38.01 or
US $25.33), with partially-insured households having the highest
contribution (Gh C53.69 or US $35.79), followed by the uninsured (Gh
C47.73 or US $31.81).P Part of the response to this problem has been to
exempt certain categories of people from premium payment, including:
children; persons in need of ante-natal, delivery, and post-natal health care
services; persons with mental disorders; indigents; pensioners; contributors
to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust; senior citizens (aged
above 70 years); and such other persons as may be prescribed by the
Minister.0
Nigeria has a specific program that caters to the health insurance needs of
indigents, known as the "Vulnerable Group Social Health Insurance
Program."O It provides free coverage to individuals who are physically
challenged, prison inmates, children less than five years old, refugees,
victims of human trafficking, internally displaced persons and immigrants,
and pregnant women and orphans. 5 Mentally challenged persons are also
included.0 Moreover, Nigeria's National Health Act requires the Minister
of Health to prescribe conditions under which some "categories of persons
may be eligible for exemption from payment for health care services at public

HEALTH INSURANCE IN NIGERIA: LEARNING FROM CASE STUDIES OF INDIA, COLOMBIA, AND

THAILAND 36 (2013) (illustrating further that the lowest enrollment in NHIS is among the

poor).
126.
Nat'l Dev. Planning Comm'n, supra note 64, at 25.
127.
Kusi et al., supra note 36, at 7.
128.
Id. at 8.
129.
National Health Insurance Scheme Act No. 852 § 29 (a-i) (2012) (Ghana).
130.
Programmes, Vulnerable Group, NAT'L HEALTH INS. SCHEME,
www.nhis.gov.ng/vulnerable-group/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
131.
Id.; See JOINT LEARNING NETWORK, NIGERIA: APPROACHES TO COVERING POOR,
VULNERABLE, AND INFORMAL POPULATIONS TO ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE

(2015), wwwjointlearningnetwork.org/resources/nigeria-approaches-to-covering-poorvulnerable-and-informal-populations-to (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (listing physically
challenged persons, prison inmates, children under five, refugees, victims of human
trafficking, internally displaced persons, pregnant women, and orphans as eligible under the
Vulnerable Groups Scheme).
132.

See NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note

31, § 1.3.2.1. (defining Physically Challenged Persons Social Health Insurance [Program]
(PCPSHIP) as "a [program] designed to provide Healthcare Services to Physically/Mentally
Challenged Persons who due to their physical status cannot engage in any meaningful
economic activity").
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health establishments." 5 Those whom the exemption contemplates are
"vulnerable roups such as women, children, older persons, and persons with
disabilities."
While these stipulations parallel regimes in other countries,
a distinguishing feature in Nigeria is the wide dissonance from the reality on
the ground, in that free coverage is, in practice, not provided to the specified
demographics. 5 No such dissonance exists in Ghana and Rwanda.E In
fact, in Ghana, the NHIA subsidizes more than eighty-two percent of total
expenditure of the DMHIS and provides eighty to ninety percent of their
revenue, 5 coupled with freedom from co-payments, co-insurance, or any
other form of deductibles. 5 In contrast, Nigeria's NHIS requires ancillary
payments such as co-payment, payment of ten percent of total cost of drugs
dispensed per prescription, and co-insurance payments related to treatments
and investigations covered under the partial exclusion list. 2
There are four major factors fueling enrollment in Rwanda's Mutuelle de
Sant, despite the high poverty rate in that country (60.4 percent).rn These
factors include: (1) heavy subsidies, 5 (2) affordable contributions, 2 (3)
drastic reduction in out-of-pocket health spending from twenty-eight to
twelve percent of total health expenditure, and (4) the institutionalization of
a wealth categorization program as a key component of the funding
mechanism. 5 This program, known as Ubudehe, was initially developed as
a basic community target scheme. 5 After the 1994 genocide, Ubudehe was
modified to expand enrollment to incorporate the national social protection
'l

133.
National Health Act 2014, Act. No. 8 § 3(1) (2014) (Nigeria).
134. Id. at § 3(2)(d).
135.
See Onoka et al., supra note 30, at 1105, 1106 (emphasizing Nigeria's difficulty in
expanding insurance coverage in a significant way or past federal employees).
136.
See Gajate-Garrido & Owusua, supra note 57, at 4 (illustrating how Ghana
subsidizes a large portion of the National Health Insurance Act); Nyandekwe, supra note 46,
at 3 (reporting that Community Based Health Insurance coverage in Rwanda has increased
from 7% in 2010, to 90.75% in 2011/2012, with overall health insurance coverage at
96.15%).

137.
Gajate-Garrido & Owusua, supra note 57, at 4.
138.
Id. (stating co-payments, co-insurance, or deductibles are required to be paid).
139.
Nat'l Health Ins. Scheme, supra note 31, at 38 Section One (stating "[i]t is 10% of
the total cost of drugs dispensed per prescription in accordance with the NHIS Drug Price
List" which is not applicable to vulnerable groups and tertiary institutions programmes).
140.

See SELIM JAHAN, supra note 22, at 219 (reporting that the percentage of the

population living below the income poverty line at purchasing power parity (PPP) of $1.90 a
day is 60.4% in Rwanda).
141.

See WORLD HEALTH REPORT supra note 29, at 7 (explaining 50 percent of the

funding is provided by the government, with the other half coming from premiums).
142.
Asaba, supra note 69.
143.
Makaka, et al., supra note 41, at 7 (reporting further that a reduction in out-ofpocket spending from 28 to 12 percent of total health expenditure).
144.
Makaka, et al., supra note 41, at 7.
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programs serving the most vulnerable citizens.0 Ubudehe not only provides
a progressively tiered contribution system and completely subsidizes the
premiums for households in the two lowest socioeconomic quintiles,
covering twenty-three percent of the population,E it also enables members
of each village to collectively assess the income, household assets, and
employment status of each person as a basis for setting the premium
amount.0 Additionally, Ibimina, a program adopted throughout Rwanda, is
a household cooperative savings mechanism initiated by a rural district,
resulting in up to forty percent of premiums being fully prepaid three months
in advance of the next fiscal year in several districts.
Ibimina allows
members to contribute a specified amount to a fund according to a defined
schedule.[
From the funds contributed, members can borrow money and
also share in interest that loans drawn from the fund generate.0
III. CONCLUSION: RECALIBRATING NIGERIA'S SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE
SYSTEM

Despite explicit proclamation of UHC as a national objective in the three
countries studied, with all three adopting fairly appropriate legal and policy
regimes aimed at using SHI to expand access to health coverage, monstrous
gaps still remain among these countries in attaining their desired
objectives. 5 At just three percent coverage rate,0 the NHIS in Nigeria
grossly underperforms vis-a-vis Rwanda and Ghana, which are currently at
seventy-five and forty percent respectively.0 This disparity highlights the
crux of this study: how to expand health insurance coverage in Nigeria by
borrowing from the strategies and experiences of Rwanda and Ghana. Aside
from the factors explored previously as core challenges confronting the NHIS
in Nigeria, attention should be drawn to the health expenditure or public
145.
Id.
146.
Republic of Rwanda, supra note 69.
147.
Makaka et al., supra note 41, at 7.
148.
Id.
149.
See generally Peterson Tumwebaze, Ibimina: How Informal GroupsAre Changing
Lives In Rural Rwanda, NEW TIMES (Nov. 8, 2013),

https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/70641 (describing how Ibimina members
contribute and lend funds).
150.
151.
rate).

152.

Id.
See generally Offiong, supra note 33 (discussing Nigerians' low NHIS enrollment

Id. (discussing Nigerians' low NHIS enrollment rate).

153.
Brookings Global Economy and Development, Towards Universal Health
Coverage in Rwanda: Summary Notes from Briefing by CarolineKayonga, BROOKINGS INST.
1 (OCT. 22, 2007), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/1022_rwanda.pdf; see also Ghana'sHealth Insurance and
UpcomingReforms, NAT'L HEALTH INS. SCHEME (Apr. 15, 2016),
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spending on health in each country. The permutation is simple: high public
expenditure on health services coupled with low out-of-pocket spending
signals progress, and the reverse holds equally true.
Although there are many standards for assessing whether the amount
expended on health care delivery is consistent with international standards
regarding advancements toward UHC, this article considers only two
standards, for brevity and pragmatic reasons. The first is total spending on
health as a percentage of general government expenditure; in other words,
the budgetary allocation to health (the Abuja Declaration requires African
governments to allocate at least fifteen percent of their annual budgets to
health).O In this context, a necessary concern should be whether Ghana
outperforms Nigeria. The latest data shows a surprising result. While
budgetary allocation to health in Ghana stands at eleven percent, the figures
for Nigeria and Rwanda are eighteen and twenty-four percent respectively,E
signifying compliance in the latter nations with the Abuja Declaration. The
second standard examines total expenditure on health by comparing
government expenditure on health with private expenditure. In 2012, the
ratio of government expenditure on health versus private expenditure was
33.2 versus 66.8 percent in Ni eria, meaning higher private spending than
government spending on health. D The reverse is typically the case in highperforming health systems.
In Ghana, government spending at the relevant
period was 68.3 percent while private expenditure was 31.7 ercent - quite
similar to Rwanda, at 58.8 versus 41.2 percent respectively.L0 Better health
outcomes in Ghana and Rwanda and robust movement toward UHC through
heightened health insurance enrollment highlight the advantages inherent in
keeping private expenditure on health care low.
Regarding budgetary allocation on health, the analysis is not
straightforward. One needs to inquire as to the reason the health insurance
system in Ghana outperforms that of Nigeria, even though its budget on
health is seven percent less than that of Nigeria.0 Among the challenges
explored in Part II of this article, to which Nigeria's NHIS is exposed, none
is more damaging to the health sector in that country than corruption and
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misappropriation of funds meant for provision of health services.
A 2008
publication succinctly captures this point, stating that, although blaming
every malaise in the country on corruption seems "somewhat exaggerated
and scarcely sustainable," according appropriate recognition to the
deleterious impact of corruption in public life is "the key to understanding
the genealogy and intractable nature of current challenges facing the country,
particularly within the health sector."0
In September 2017, the Panel that the Federal Ministry of Health tasked
with investigating the activities of the suspended Executive Secretary of the
NHIS, Usman Yusuf, submitted its report to the Presidency.E It indicted
Yusuf for large-scale fraud and embezzlement of funds, and recommended
his referral to the EFCC.I Recall that Part II of this article documented that
the two previous executive secretaries, who were top administrators of the
Scheme, face similar charges before the EFCC and ICPC.E Regardless of
the outcome, one thing remains clear: the maxim "where there is smoke, there
is fire" is apposite in this context. Even if the Executive Secretary, described
in said report as having "portrayed a holier-than-thou attitude but in the
background, milked the agency dry,"O is eventually cleared of direct
involvement in the scandal, enormous damage has already been inflicted
upon the Scheme and its future.E The perception that the leadership of the
apex health insurance institution in the country is populated by 'crooks'
would hardly incentivize enrollment, even if all the other challenges
enumerated in this article are addressed. Therefore, without appearing to
diminish the seriousness of other problems confronting NHIS in Nigeria, the
question of corruption must be accorded priority in any future reform
process.E
Additionally, the funding base of Nigeria's NHIS must be strengthened to
accelerate the pace toward UHC. Worthy of consideration is Ghana's
National Health Insurance (NHI) Levy, which is a value-added tax imposed
at the rate of 2.5 percent upon oods and services provided in Ghana, whether
produced locally or imported. L The levy generates about sixty percent of
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the total revenue funding Ghana's Scheme, making it the major source of
funding for the country's NHIS.E This funding system offers a fine example
for emerging SHI Schemes in Africa, such as Nigeria's NHIS.
The last key lesson deserving of Nigerian policymakers' attention is the
role of compulsory insurance in attaining UHC. Except for formal sector
workers in the country, enrollment in Ni eria's NHIS is voluntary, in contrast
to enrollment in Rwanda and Ghana.
This contrast in voluntary versus
involuntary enrollment partially explains the wide disparity in attainment
levels among the three nations. Mandatory insurance is consistent with the
current global trend, as forcefully canvased in a 2009 article. 5 WHO
similarly affirmed that not only does "compulsory prepayment [provide] the
most efficient and equitable path towards universal coverage. . . countries
that have come closest to achieving universal health coverage," are those
where "prepayment is the norm, organized though eneral taxation and/or
compulsory contributions to health insurance."
WHO was quite
unequivocal, asserting that "in the long run, participation will need to be
compulsory if 100 [percent] of the population is to be covered."0 The
inevitable consequence of not heeding this admonition by the global apex
health institution, as well as the other recommendations and suggestions of
this article, will be either retrogression or continued stagnation of Nigeria's
NHIS - an outcome that nobody wants and, therefore, should be avoided at
all costs.
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